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Abstract
The paper investigates the dynamic relationship between social trust and economic governance us-
ing a principal-agent model with stochastic returns. To mitigate the inherent moral hazard problem
both intrinsic and extrinsic incentives are useful. The cooperative tendency of an agent measures
his intrinsic discipline against shirking, the distribution of which characterizes social trust in society.
The economic governance methods include direct monitoring and eﬃciency wage. The main results
are the following. An agent with a higher cooperative tendency needs less monitoring and a lower
wage to make eﬀort, which brings higher profit for the principal. But competition among principals
for more cooperative agents drains away the extra profit and passes it on to the agent as a sign-in
bonus. So an agent with a higher cooperative tendency ends up earning a higher total income. In the
short run when cooperative tendencies are fixed, the distribution of economic governance intensity in
the economy is determined by social trust. In the long run when cooperative tendencies are endoge-
nously formed to maximize an agent’s lifetime utility, both social trust and economic governance are
determined by fundamentals such as the costs of monitoring, screening, and investing in cooperative
tendency. In the steady state, social trust increases in monitoring cost and decreases in screening
and investing costs. An important insight the paper delivers is that principals always benefit from
a lower monitoring cost but not necessarily from a higher social trust. Both downward and upward
movement of social trust and economic governance, once started, would continue monotonically.
Their relative strength across societies is preserved or reinforced over time.
1 Introduction
Consider a mother who needs to hire a baby-sitter for several hours. If she finds the candidate baby-
sitter trustworthy enough based on interviews and reference letters, she may have a peace of mind
that her child would be well taken care of. If the baby-sitter seems not so reliable, the mother may
have to install a (hidden) video camera to monitor the baby-sitter’s behavior. The aggregate usage
of such monitoring schemes, which varies a lot over time and across societies, is thus aﬀected by how
easy it is to find a trustworthy baby-sitter. On the other hand, the supply of trustworthy baby-sitters
is not completely exogenous since it takes a lot of time and eﬀort to inoculate trustworthiness in
a person.1 To illustrate this point, suppose some day in future technologies are so advanced that
perfect monitoring incurs only a negligible cost. Would a mother still try to find a trustworthy
baby-sitter? Not anymore, since all baby-sitters would behave the same when their eﬀort is fully
observed and rewarded. Given this, would parents still take the trouble to bring up trustworthy
children? Maybe not.2
This baby-sitter example suggests two distinct but interdependent ways of reducing moral hazard
in a principal-agent relationship: intrinsic and extrinsic incentives. A society may spend resources
increasing intrinsic trustworthiness in its citizens or reducing monitoring costs through technologies
and mechanisms. The resource allocation decisions are made by many rational individuals, which
in aggregation shape the evolution paths of social trust and economic governance.
This paper formalizes these insights in the context of a principal-agent model and across-
generation dynamics where an agent’s cooperative tendency is endogenously chosen to maximize
his life-time utilities. Given the extrinsic incentives, an agent’s trustworthiness in a game is com-
pletely determined by his cooperative tendency which by definition measures his intrinsic incentives
to cooperate or make eﬀort, and social trust in this economy is characterized by the distribution of
cooperative tendencies among agents. The relevant economic governance methods consist of direct
monitoring and eﬃciency wage.
In the basic model cooperative tendencies are perfectly observed. A higher cooperative tendency
1For example, Shavell (2002) claims that "The establishment of moral rules is evidently very expensive from a social
perspective, assuming that this occurs through socialization and inoculation. To instill the moral rules ... requires
constant eﬀort over the years of childhood (and perhaps reinforcement thereafter). If we regard the duties of parents,
schools, and religious institutions as comprised importantly of the teaching of children in the moral dimension, then
we can appreciate that society’s investment in imbuing moral rules is substantial."
2 In the other extreme where there is no cost in bringing up trustworthy children, the costly monitoring is not
needed anymore.
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enables the agent to make eﬀort under less monitoring and a lower eﬃciency wage, which gener-
ates a higher profit for the principal. The resulted competition among principals for cooperative
agents, however, passes the extra profit to the agents. At the end of the day, agents with higher
cooperative tendencies earn higher incomes which increase in monitoring cost. In the steady state
of across-generation dynamics, the cooperative tendency and hence social trust are higher in a so-
ciety where monitoring is more costly. To the extent that exogenous technologies and knowledge
accumulation tend to bring down monitoring costs over time, the decline of social trust is a natural
trend. Furthermore, notice that principals do not capture any rent from agent trustworthiness, but
their profits can be improved by reducing monitoring cost. So principals have all the incentives in
finding cheaper ways to monitor agents rather than improving social trust, which may lead to faster
reduction of monitoring cost than the exogenous rate, and hence quicker decline of social trust.
This incentive structure in allocating resources between social trust and economic governance also
suggests that, if everything else is the same, a society where principals control more resources may
have higher intensity of economic governance and lower social trust, and vice versa.
These results still hold up to minor adjustments when the basic model is extended to various cases
such as diﬀerent tasks and costly screening. When there are multiple tasks with diﬀerent monitoring
costs, more cooperative agents are sorted into tasks with higher monitoring costs, but they have
to share rents with principals. In the steady state there are still multiple levels of cooperative
tendencies. Principals with higher monitoring costs gain more from agent cooperative tendency, and
less from monitoring cost reduction. On the other hand, the fact that agents do not get the full
rent leads to socially ineﬃcient investment in cooperative tendency (and hence social trust). As
the gap of monitoring costs between projects shrinks, the rent captured by principals also decreases
and may disappear in the limit. This again demonstrates that for principals any rent from agent
trustworthiness is of transitory nature. In other words, a lower monitoring cost would definitely
increase profits, while competition may drain away any benefit of hiring a more cooperative agent.
When a positive screening cost has to be paid to observe agent cooperative tendencies, some
principals may choose not to screen. And ultimately it is the agents that bear the screening cost,
while principals earn a higher profit than the complete information case. This partial rent captured
by principals, however, disappears in the long run when cooperative tendencies are endogenously
formed to maximize agent utilities. So principals have no incentives in reducing screening costs
either. In the steady state some agents are completely selfish while others have identical cooperative
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tendency. Besides increasing in monitoring cost, social trust now also decreases in screening cost.
Our results suggest that in the long run both social trust and economic governance are determined
by the costs of monitoring, screening, and investing in agents. The reduction processes of these costs,
which have diﬀerent incentive and technical features, would jointly shape the trajectories of social
trust and economic governance over time. If we assume that the monitoring cost decreases in the
total amount of monitoring used by all principals, then its reduction rate is lower when social trust
is higher. On the other hand, since the aggregate marginal benefit of a lower screening cost increases
in the proportion of cooperative agents, it follows naturally that the reduction rate of screening cost
increases in social trust.3 If the reduction process of screening cost dominates that of monitoring cost,
then social trust would move upward over time. If the contrary is true, then social trust would move
downward over time.4 Across societies, social trust is always lower and economic governance always
more intensive in a society where the initial screening cost is higher. These results are consistent
with the historical evidence of two trader groups discussed by Greif (1994) and across-community
variation of social trust documented by Alesina and Ferrara (2002) among others. They may also
account for the broad diﬀerences between the organization of Confucian societies and the West.
Recent empirical work in the burgeoning social trust literature shows that both social trust and
economic governance are important for economic growth and social welfare (Knack and Keefer,
1997; La Porta et. al 1997; Fukuyama 1995; Putnam 1993, 1995). But little is understood about
their complex dynamic relationship. This paper makes contributions in this aspect. It analyzes the
dynamic interactions between social trust and economic governance and how they are determined
by and then aﬀect economic fundamentals. Many of its results are broadly consistent with both
across-sectional variation and time paths of social trust and economic governance.
The economic governance literature often takes as exogenously given diﬀerent cooperative ten-
dencies of agents, but is unaware of its intimate relationship with social trust. For example, Dixit
(2003) assumes three exogenous types namely honest, dishonest, and opportunist when he studies
contract governance, where honest agents always cooperate. The same assumption is used by, among
others, Tirole (1996) in his study of collective reputation, and Rob and Yang (2003) in their work
on long-term relationships. Since both honest and dishonest types are irrational agents who do not
maximize their utilities, the feedback from type-specific incomes to type distribution is cut oﬀ. This
3The inoculation cost of cooperative tendency is such a complex process that its changing rate is normalize to zero.
4This trend may be set back time by time, however, when new kinds of economic activities are generated and the
associated monitoring costs are very high initially.
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may be justified in a short time when types are fixed, but not in the long run when types can be
endogenously chosen. So a seemingly eﬃcient governance mode in a static environment may have
unintended long run eﬀects on type distribution and turns out to be not optimal. One such example
at the firm level is illustrasted by Rob and Zemsky (2002).
In a similar theme to the current paper, Shavell (2002) studies the relative eﬀectiveness of morality
and law as means of control of conduct;5 Sobel (2002) contrasts informal relational contracts with
formal legal institutions in supporting partnerships; and Li (1999) distinguishes between relation-
based and rule-based modes of governance (also see the discussion by Dixit 2003 and Greif 1997).
The emphasis of these studies is the relative merits and costs of diﬀerent governance modes rather
than their dynamic interactions. It seems plausible that the analytical framework of this paper can
also be fruitfully applied to these cases.
The paper is organized as follows. In the second section a simple principal-agent model is
introduced and across-generational dynamics are analyzed. The basic model is extended to multiple
tasks and positive screening costs in the following two sections. The trajectories and across-sectional
variation of social trust and economic governance are analyzed in details in section five. The final
section concludes.
2 The Basic Model
2.1 The Stage Game: A Simple Principal-Agent Model
A principal hires an agent from a pool of potential candidates to complete a project. The outcome is
stochastic. If the agent makes the appropriate eﬀort e, he produces h > 0 with probability p ∈ [0, 1]
and 0 with probability 1 − p. If the agent shirks, the probability of getting h is q ∈ [0, 1), where
q < p. The cost of eﬀort is C(e) where hp − C(e) > hq holds so that making eﬀort e is the social
optimal choice. Principals are identical with unit mass. The reservation utility of agents and the
alternative return for principals are normalized to zero.
Agents are heterogenous in predisposition to cooperate. There are a continuum of agents indexed
by i ∈ [0, 1], where agent i has a cooperative tendency αi ∈ [0,+∞) such that he feels guilty of the
amount αi if he shirks. The cumulative distribution function of cooperative tendency among agents is
5Actually trustworthiness is arguably the core moral since it enables agents to maximize the social welfare rather
than their selfish ones. Shavell (2002) writes: "Arguably, the only overarching principle that could rationalize all these
diverse (moral) rules is that of a general utilitarianism, of social welfare maximization. It does seem true that a form
of this principle not only could be, but in fact is, imbued in us: the general obligation to do good, to do whatever it
is that helps society."
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F (·) with support [0, A], which characterizes social trust. As Shavell (2002) has observed, inoculated
moral rules are not subject to alteration in the short run; it will often take at least a generation to
accomplish that. Indeed, a cooperative tendency is usually formed in one’s childhood and becomes
a stable character through one’s life. So the quality of workforce is often considered as a constraint
by principals when choosing incentive schemes.
There are many ways to mitigate the inherent moral hazard problem in a principal-agent sit-
uation. All of them, however, can be essentially categorized into two distinct groups: some rely
on intrinsic incentives of agents and others on extrinsic incentives. For instance, the principal can
screen agents to select a trustworthy one through interviews, reference letters, obtaining the agent’s
past histories through credit bureau or hiring a detective, etc. This character-based screening aims
to make usage of an agent’s intrinsic incentives to cooperate. On the other hand, she can direct the
agent’s work personally or monitor the agent through a video camera or accounting and auditing
system, and design incentive pays accordingly to make sure appropriate eﬀort is made. These are
behavior- or performance-based economic governance schemes which provide extrinsic incentives to
induce agents to cooperate. Both types of practices are quite common and often simultaneously used
by a principal (see for example Ichiowski et al. 1997). Their distinct characteristics and interactions
are illustrated in the paper through the analysis of screening and monitoring plus a fixed wage. The
qualitative results would not change if alternative combinations of schemes are used because the
fundamental driving forces are the diﬀerent working mechanisms of intrinsic and extrinsic incentives
in achieving cooperation.
Agents are risk averse and thus prefer a constant wage rather than outcome-contingent incomes.
To reduce shirking associated with a fixed wage, the principal can use screening and monitoring.
Suppose with certain screening cost s a principal can correctly assess an agent’s cooperative tendency.
After an agent’s cooperative tendency αi is revealed, the principal chooses wage wi and a direct
monitoring level mi ∈ [0, 1], where mi is the probability that shirking is observed. The total
monitoring cost is mic(k) where c(k) measures the cost of using monitoring technologies such as
video cameras in the workplace. If the agent is caught shirking, he will get zero wage.6
6This simple model arguably captures the essence of more complicated screening and incentive schemes in analyzing
the relationship between social trust and economic governance. Allowing imperfect screening and other incentives only
change the results in a quantitative aspect without bringing new insights. Similarly, since what repeated interactions
can do in mitigating the moral hazard problem is either type-revealing or imposing extra extrinsic incentives, they
would not add any new functions beyond those of screening and monitoring in a one-period relationship.
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To solve the model analytically we adopt functional forms
C(e) = ez+1, c(k) = kz+1, u(w) = wz,
where a common parameter z ∈ (0, 1] is used only to simplify notation. We first study the case
where the cost of screening is zero.
2.1.1 The Optimization Problem
An agent with a cooperative tendency αi incurs disutility or guilt αi whenever he shirks, regardless
of being caught or not by the principal. Given the incentive package (wi,mi), the agent gets utility
wzi − ez+1 when making eﬀort e and wzi (1 − mi) − αi if not. He would not shirk if the following
condition
wzi − ez+1 ≥ wzi (1−mi)− αi (1)
holds. For agents with αi ≤ ez+1, this leads to the condition for monitoring
mi ≥ w−zi (ez+1 − αi) ≡ mi, (2)
where mi is the minimum monitoring level to deter shirking. Note that mi decreases in wage wi
and cooperative tendency αi. Since monitoring is costly, the principal always chooses the minimum
possible level mi just enough to induce the agent to makes eﬀort.7 So the principal’s objective
function is
max
wi
Qci ≡ hp− wi − w−zi (ez+1 − αi)kz+1.
The optimal wage is then
w∗i = ωk(e
z+1 − αi)
1
z+1 (3)
where ω ≡ z 1z+1 . Note for αi ≤ ez+1 the optimal wage w∗i is higher than the agent’s reservation
wage zero, which is indeed an eﬃciency wage to reward appropriate eﬀort and help prevent shirking.
Plug w∗i into equation (2) we get the optimal monitoring level
m∗i = (ωk)
−z(ez+1 − αi)
1
z+1 . (4)
The profit from hiring an agent with αi is thus
Q∗i = hp− (1 + z−1)ωk(ez+1 − αi)
1
z+1 . (5)
7Actually positive monitoring is chosen if and only if the monitoring cost is low enough such that k ≤ h(p−q)
(1+z−1)ωe
holds. See the next footnote for more details.
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Both optimal wage w∗i and monitoring level m
∗
i decrease in the agent’s cooperative tendency αi,
while the profit increases in αi.
Agents with αi ≥ ez+1 always make eﬀort through intrinsic incentives so that no extrinsic
incentives are needed. Since the optimal monitoring and wage for them are zero, the highest possible
profit hp is achieved. On the other hand, for completely selfish agents with αi = 0, the principal
has to use the most intensive incentive package including the highest wage
w∗ ≡ ωke
and the highest monitoring level
m∗ ≡ (ωk)−ze
to prevent them from shirking. This leads to the lowest profit for a principal8
Q∗ ≡ hp− (1 + z−1)ωke. (6)
A principal hiring an agent with αi gets a higher profit Q∗i than Q
∗ because she does not need to
adopt the most expensive incentive package (w∗,m∗). That is, the intrinsic incentives are substitutes
for the extrinsic incentives provided by principals, and the extra profit Q∗i −Q∗ is essentially a rent
generated by cooperative tendency αi.
2.1.2 The Equilibrium
Since profit Q∗i increases in αi, all principals prefer an agent with a higher cooperative tendency.
Given that principals are identical and their mass is the same as that of agents, the competition
among principals will eventually drive profits to the lowest level Q∗ and pass all the rent Q∗i −Q∗
to agents in the form of a sign-in bonus B∗i where
B∗i = Q
∗
i −Q∗ =
(
(1 + z−1)ωk(e− (ez+1 − αi)
1
z+1 ) if αi ≤ ez+1
(1 + z−1)ωke if αi ≥ ez+1
. (7)
So an agent with αi ≤ ez+1 gets income I∗i ≡ w∗i +B∗i , the sum of wage and bonus. It is easy to
check that agent income increases in both αi and k. It can be rewritten as
I∗i = w
∗ + bB(αi, k)
8Actually the lowest expected profit a principal can get is max{Q∗, hq}, where hq is achieved when she hires a
completely selfish agent with zero wage and no monitoring. This implies that monitoring is chosen if and only if
Q∗ ≥ hq, which leads to k ≤ h(p−q)
(1+z−1)ωe .
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Figure 1: Economic Governance Intensity and Agent Incomes as Functions of Cooperative Tendency
where w∗ is the wage of a selfish player, and
bB(αi) = z−1ωk(e− (ez+1 − αi) 1z+1 ) (8)
is the extra income due to αi. Since bB(αi, k) increases in αi, so does the individual income I∗i . The
selfish agent gets the lowest income equal to his wage w∗ = ωke. The highest income an agent can
get is (1 + z−1)ωke when αi ≥ ez+1, which is (1 + z−1) times that of a selfish agent.9
Similarly, the distributions of monitoring level m∗i and wage w
∗
i are completely determined by
that of cooperative tendency, where their respective supports are [0,m∗] and [0, w∗]. For example,
from condition(4) we can get the cumulative distribution function of monitoring G(m) ≡ 1−F (ez+1−
zz(kzm)z+1). This suggests that the overall economic governance intensity in society is determined
by social trust. The distributions of income I∗i , sign-in bonus B
∗
i , eﬃciency wage w
∗
i , and monitoring
level m∗i are illustrated in figure 1.
The social welfare includes the profits of all principals and the incomes of all agents, which is
equal to
W =
Z ez+1
0
(Q∗i + w
∗
i )dF (αi) + (1− F (ez+1))hp.
9For example, when z = 1n the most cooperative agent earns n times that of a selfish agent even though they have
identical producing ability. This illustrates the important eﬀects of non-cognitive skills on individual incomes (see
Heckman 1999).
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When αi follows uniform distribution with cdf F (αi) = αiA on the support [0, A], it becomes
W = hp− z + 1
z + 2
ω−z
kez+2
A
.
It is straightforward to check that W increases in A and decreases in monitoring cost k, where A
is a suﬃcient statistic for social trust level. Furthermore, the marginal gain from increasing social
trust is higher when it is more costly to monitor:
∂2W
∂A∂k
=
z + 1
z + 2
ω−z
ez+2
A2
> 0.
The same condition suggests the marginal gain from reducing monitoring cost k is lower when social
trust is higher. These results are summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 1 The intensity of economic governance, measured by eﬃciency wage w∗i and moni-
toring level m∗i , decreases in agent cooperative tendency αi. The rent generated by αi is completely
passed to the agent as a sign-in bonus B∗i due to competition among principals for more cooperative
agents. In equilibrium all principals get the same profit Q∗ independent of αi, where Q∗ decreases in
monitoring cost k. Agent income I∗i increases in both αi and k. The marginal gain of social welfare
from social trust is higher when monitoring is more costly.
When cooperative tendencies are readily observable with no cost, principals adjust monitoring
and wage accordingly to take advantage of agents’ innate disciplines and save on governance cost.
Due to perfect competition among identical principals, the full rent is captured by agents as a bonus,
leaving all principals with exactly the same profit as if they had hired an agent with zero cooperative
tendency. In other words, in equilibrium principals do not get any benefits from hiring a cooperative
agent.
2.2 Across-Generation Dynamics
In order to understand the dynamic interactions between social trust and economic governance,
we have to study the across-generation evolution of cooperative tendency distribution. Suppose all
principals live forever, while agents work for one period and die afterwards. Each agent also raises
a child and is replaced by the grown-up child when he dies. All children are endowed with the
same productivity and zero cooperative tendency, where the latter can be increased by parental
investment. Parents are altruistic and try to maximize child lifetime welfare.
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2.2.1 Investing in Cooperative Tendency
Since cooperative agents earn extra incomes bB(αi) in this economy, parents do have incentives in
improving their children’s cooperative tendencies. The parental cost of investing in child cooperative
tendency α2i is a convex function in α2i and decreasing in parent cooperative tendency α1i. The
cost function is
c(α2i;α1i) =
c[e(z+1)a − (ez+1 − α2i)a]
(1 + α1i)b
, (9)
where a, b, c,∈ R+. Note there is no cost in keeping the initial zero cooperative tendency since
c(α2i = 0;α1i) = 0.10 So the net return of investing in α2i is
Ri ≡ max
α2i
bB(α2i)− c(α2i;α1i),
where bB(α2i) is given by condition (8).
Since agents with αi > ez+1 earn the same income as αi = ez+1 but incur larger investing
costs, all agents in the second generation onwards must have αi ≤ ez+1. The optimal solution and
comparative statics are in the following lemma for the case a < 1z+1 (the proof is in the appendix).
The results when a ≥ 1z+1 holds are qualitatively similar, which are proved and summarized in
proposition (9) in the appendix.
Lemma 1 When a < 1z+1 holds, the unique optimal solution is
α∗2i ≡ g(α1i) = ez+1 − [γ(1 + α1i)
−b
1−a(z+1) ]z+1, (10)
where
γ ≡ (z(z + 1)ca
ωk
)
1
1−a(z+1) .
It is strictly increasing and concave in α1i. It also increases in monitoring cost k.
2.2.2 The Steady State
Since g(·) is strictly increasing and concave in the compact set [0, A], the pair of father and son with
identical cooperative tendency αc is uniquely determined by
αc = g(αc).
Actually if bB(αi) does not change over time, αc is also the unique steady state cooperative tendency
in society after n generations, where n is the number of generations for a family with α1i = 0 to
10When there is a fixed cost of investing in cooperative tendency, it is possible that some parents with lower
cooperative tendencies may not invest in their children. This will become clear in the next section.
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achieve αni = αc.11 The evolving process is illustrated in figure 2. In the 2nd generation the lowest
cooperative tendency
α2 ≡ g(α1i = 0) = ez+1 − γz+1 > 0
is positive when e ≥ γ holds, while the highest one is α2 ≡ g(α1i = A) < ez+1 < A (though it
approaches ez+1 when A is positive infinite). So the support of cooperative tendency shrinks from
[0, A] to [α2, α2] after one generation, and it becomes more concentrated over time until degenerating
to the single level αc.
During this transition process, is it possible for principals to earn higher profits? For example,
in the second generation the lowest cooperative tendency α2 is positive. Our previous arguments
suggest that principals can get extra profits exploitative by reducing agents’ sign-in bonus of the
amount bB(α2). If this is true, the bottom agents would get zero bonus and lower wage w∗(α2) < w∗
than their fathers, which cannot be an equilibrium. So either that principals stick to the fair bonus
system bB(αi), or the bottom agents would always remain with zero cooperative tendency. In both
cases, principals cannot earn more than Q∗ in the long run. For simplicity, we assume the former
scenario is true where bB(αi) is always observed. So in the steady state the incentive package (w∗c ,m∗c)
and bonus B∗c are determined respectively by conditions (3), (4), and (7) where αi = αc. Principals
always earn the same profit Q∗, both during the transition periods and in the steady state.
Proposition 2 The cooperative tendency evolves across generation according to the transition func-
tion α∗(n+1)i ≡ g(αni) in (10). The range of cooperative tendencies shrinks overtime until it degen-
erates to the unique steady state αc ∈ (0, ez+1). αc increases in monitoring cost k. Principals always
get the same profit Q∗ as when the hired agent is completely selfish.
2.2.3 Discussions
When cooperative tendencies are endogenously formed to maximize agent life-time utilities, they are
higher when the monitoring cost k is high or the cost of investing in cooperative tendency is low.
Both costs tend to go down as time goes by even in the absence of intentional eﬀort. The technical
diﬀerences between cooperative tendency investment and monitoring, however, seem to favor the
latter. “The establishment of moral rules ... comes about in part through a complex process
of socialization, learning, and inoculation” for many years from one’s childhood onward (Shavell
11Here we implicitly assume that it takes fewer generations for the family with the highest cooperative tendency
α1 = A to reach the steady state αc. It does not matter if it is the other way around.
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Figure 2: Across-Generation Evolving of Cooperative Tendencies When a < 1z+1
2002). This process is sensitive to both individual characteristics and social/cultural features, and
thus diﬃcult to be standardized and improved upon. In contrast, monitoring technologies can be
applied to various situations and last over many generations. As a natural result of this imbalanced
knowledge accumulation process, social trust would decline over time and at the same time the
economic governance intensity (measured by the monitoring level) would go up.
This pattern of relative eﬀectiveness would continue at least in the near future unless gene
technologies sharply cut the investing cost of cooperative tendencies, or new activities diﬃcult to
monitor arise more quickly than technologies can handle.12 In the earlier history of human society,
however, the opposite trend can be true since technologies changed so slowly that the monitoring
cost remained almost the same for hundreds of years, while on the other hand stable communities
helped reduce the cost of bringing up cooperative children. So the trajectories of social trust and
economic governance are aﬀected by the exogenous movements of the relative costs of monitoring
and investing in cooperative tendencies.
To the extent that knowledge accumulation and technological advancement are mainly driven by
intentional eﬀort of optimizing individuals, the incentive structure in cost reduction may be much
more important than the technical features described above. A key insight generated by our basic
12One example of the latter case may be the global terrorism that is extremely costly, if not possible, to monitor.
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model is that principals have no incentives in improving social trust but strong incentives in reducing
monitoring cost. Recall from the above proposition that principals always get the same profit Q∗
and are not able to capture any rent from cooperative tendencies. On the other hand, Q∗ can be
increased by reducing monitoring cost k (for example, through finding more eﬃcient monitoring
methods or advanced technology in transportation and communication). If principals control more
resources in society than agents, monitoring costs are likely to be reduced faster than investment
costs of cooperative tendency. Again social trust would decline over time and economic governance
intensity would go up, which seems broadly consistent with the recent history.
The diﬀerent ways of handling moral hazard problems in two traders group discussed by Greif
(1994) can be used to test our results. In the late medieval period “the Maghribis and the Genoese
faced a similar environment, employed comparable naval technology, and traded in similar goods."
The Maghribi traders (from the Muslim world) typically acted both as principals and agents si-
multaneously, while the Genoese traders (from the Latin world) seldom acted as agents themselves.
Given this diﬀerent social structure, our model suggests that the Maghribi traders would have more
incentives in improving cooperative tendencies and less incentives in reducing monitoring costs. The
reason is straightforward: All Maghribi traders, who acted as agents themselves, were able to share
the rents from higher cooperative tendencies. The Genoese traders, however, acted only as principals
and thus did not benefit from agents being more cooperative. This prediction is indeed supported by
historical evidence where the Maghribi traders adopted the view that community members shared
the fundamental duty to practice good and to ensure that others do not practice sin, maintained close
social ties so that the costs of training and screening trustworthy agents were greatly reduced, paid
lower eﬃciency wages to agents, and did not use available technologies to reduce monitoring costs.
The Genoese traders paid higher eﬃciency wages to agents and were very keen on adopting new
technologies and setting up new institutions to reduce monitoring costs. Their reliance on monitor-
ing rather than individual mores also made the Genoese society more open to outsiders and helped
them expanding international trade faster than the Maghribi traders. Our model suggests that the
basic incentive structures in society lead to distinct institutional structures and path dependence,
which is an alternative interpretation to the cultural belief version argued by Greif (1994).13
13The story proposed here is not the contrast between individualist and collectivist per se, but the contrast between
investing in individuals/mores and investing in impersonal institutions/governance (whether it be economic, legal, or
political governance).
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3 Multiple Projects with Diﬀerent Monitoring Costs
In this section we study an extension to the basic model. Suppose principals have multiple projects
which have diﬀerent monitoring costs kj , j = 1, 2, ..., J , where k1 < k2 < ... < kJ . The proportion
of principals with project kj is ρj such that
PJ
j=1 ρj = 1. There is no screening cost.
Fix a project, a principal’s optimization problem is the same as before. So the optimal wage
and monitoring level are also determined by (3) and (4). The competition among principals again
would drive their profits down to the lowest level in the same project. The multiple projects,
however, induces across-project competition among agents. Agents strictly prefer projects with
higher monitoring costs since the maximum income an agent can get increases in the monitoring
cost of a project. And as would be shown in the following, principals also prefer agents with higher
cooperative tendencies. So in equilibrium there is positive sorting where more cooperative agents
work for projects with higher monitoring costs.
Project k1 has the lowest monitor cost so it can only attract agents with lowest cooperative
tendencies in the whole population. Since the mass of project k1 is ρ1, the proportion of agents
working for it must also be ρ1 in equilibrium. These two conditions imply ρ1 = F (αk1), where
αk1 denotes the highest cooperative tendency of agents in project k1. The least cooperative agent
working for it is of course complete selfish. So the situation for project k1 is exactly the same as the
one project case before, where principals get profit Q∗(k1) by condition (6) and oﬀer sign-in bonus
B(αi, k1) by (7) to an agent with αi ∈ [0, αk1 ].
Principals having project k2, however, can take advantage of agent competition and oﬀer a lower
sign-in bonus than in the one-project case. Consider an agent with αk1 . If project k2 is the only
project for all principals, the agent would earn income I(αk1 , k2). But now with multiple projects,
his best alternative income is I(αk1 , k1) when he works for project k1. So a principal with project
k2 needs to pay him only I(αk1 , k1) and keeps the residual I(αk1 , k2)− I(αk1 , k1) ≡ r2 where
r2 = ω(k2 − k1)[(1 + z−1)e− z−1(ez+1 − αk1)
1
z+1 )].
This leaves the agent with a lower sign-in bonus Bm(αi, k2) ≡ B(αi, k2) − r2. Note r2 is part of
the rent generated by cooperative tendency, which increases in αk1 . The principal, earning a profit
Qm∗2 = Q
∗(k2)+ r2, gains from a higher αk1 . Actually Q
m∗
2 is the profit got by all principals having
project k2 due to within-project competition among principals. Agent working for project k2 must
have αi ∈ [αk1 , αk2 ] where αk2 is determined by ρ1+ρ2 = F (αk2). The same arguments are true for
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other projects as well, where the results are summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 3 In equilibrium an agent with αi ∈ [αkj , αkj+1 ] works for project j + 1 where αkj is
determined by
F (αkj ) =
jX
v=1
ρv (11)
and αk0 = 0. He gets a sign-in bonus B
m(αi, kj+1) = B(αi, kj+1) − rj+1, while his principal gets
profit
Qm∗j+1 = Q
∗(kj+1) + rj+1, (12)
where
rj+1 ≡ I(αkj , kj+1)− I(αkj , kj)
= ω(kj+1 − kj)[(1 + z−1)e− z−1(ez+1 − αkj )
1
z+1 )] (13)
for j ≥ 1 and r1 = 0. rj+1 is the rent captured by principals, which increases in αkj and the gap of
monitoring cost kj+1 − kj.
When cooperative tendencies are endogenous, the net benefit for an agent/parent with α1i in-
vesting in α2i for his child (who will later work for project kj) is
Rij ≡ max
α2i
bBm(α2i, kj)− c(α2i;α1i),
where bBm(α2i, kj) = B(α2i, kj) − rj + w∗(α2i, kj) − w∗(0, k1) as in (8). It strictly increases in kj ,
which implies that all agents prefer their children to work for projects with higher monitoring costs.
In equilibrium, however, only those with lower investing costs (i.e. higher parental cooperative
tendency α1i) succeed. So in this economy with perfect social heredity, descendants of an agent
would work for the same project across generations and no one ever climbs up the project ladder.14
This is as if each family is faced with only one project. So the same arguments in the one project
case apply here, and in the steady state there are J diﬀerent levels of cooperative tendencies αcj
where αcj < αcj+1. This is summarized in the following proposition and illustrated in figure (3).
Proposition 4 Agents of the same family work for the same project for all generations. In the
steady state there are J diﬀerent levels of cooperative tendencies αcj where αcj < αcj+1.
14Daniel L. McFadden in his autobiography describes an example of this sort. At MIT He was given a chair in the
name of James Killian, the revered former president of MIT whose grandfather had owned the cotton mill in which
McFadden’s grandfather was the chief mechanic. Bob Solow commented, “So much for social mobility in America;
after two generations, you are still a mechanic in Killian’s mill.”
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Project 1
Project 2
Project 3
Figure 3: Evolving of Cooperative Tendencies with Three Projects
In this multiple project economy diﬀerent monitoring costs enable principals to share the rent
of cooperative tendency with agents, which leads to an incentive structure diﬀerent from the one-
project case. The following lemma summarizes the properties of profit function Qm∗j+1 (proof in
appendix).
Lemma 2 Profit Qm∗j+1 decreases in monitoring cost kj+1 while increases in αkj . The marginal
gain from monitoring cost reduction, however, is not only lower than the one project case, but also
decreases in αkj . The marginal gain from αkj increases in kj+1.
So principals with higher monitoring costs have less incentives in reducing monitoring costs and
more in improving cooperative tendencies for agents. This may account for why some firms are
willing to oﬀer scholarships or other subsidies to schools and communities. But principals with the
same project are linked by a public good αkj , the lowest cooperative tendency among their agents.
So the subsidy in cooperative tendency inoculation is subject to free riding problems typical in
public goods provision, and is usually not socially optimal. Agents would not make socially eﬃcient
investment in cooperative tendencies either, since they do not get the full rent.
But the transitory nature of the rent captured by principals is still true. As the gap of monitoring
costs between projects shrinks, the rent decreases and may disappear at the limit. The profit gain
from monitoring cost reduction, however, belongs firmly to principals. So even though principals
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may be able to share the rent of cooperative tendency in some occasions, it is easy to be drained
away by competition and other forces (see the discussion below on screening).
4 Costly Screening
This section studies another extension to the basic model where a principal has to pay a positive
screening cost in order to observe an agent’s cooperative tendency. Examples of screening include
paying credit bureaus or headhunters to get one’s past history, requesting reference letters and
qualification credentials, and conducting thorough interviews and tests. Better screening incurs
a higher cost, but it allows principals to adopt a better fit incentive package and hence reducing
governance costs. Since all principals are identical, they must earn the same profit independent of
screening choice. This would lead to a positive sorting in equilibrium where principals spending more
on screening are matched with agents with higher cooperative tendencies. And imperfect screening
implies some agents have to pool together and receive identical incentive package, even though they
behave diﬀerently.
4.1 The Stage Game with Screening
In the following we focus on a simple screening scheme where there are only two choices: incurring
a fixed screening cost s to accurately observe a cooperative tendency, or paying nothing and no
information is revealed.15 Since the screening cost s is the same regardless of the true αi while the
potential profit strictly increases in αi, there must exist a minimum cooperative tendency bα such
that only agents with αi ≥ bα are hired after being screened. Given this hiring criterion, agents with
αi < bα would not bother to be screened since they would be rejected anyway. Therefore a principal
who does not screen must get these less cooperative agents. Note that if screening is ever used then
bα < ez+1 must be true since agents with αi ∈ [ez+1, A] behave identically in this environment. We
thus assume bα < ez+1 holds.
4.1.1 Pooling
Non-screening principals must choose the same wage wr and monitoring level mr since all pooling
agents look the same to them. Given this incentive menu, agents with αi ≥ αr would make eﬀort
15Let’s consider a more general, continuous screening technology. Suppose the true cooperative tendency αi is
observed with some noise ε so that a principal observes a signal cαi = αi + ε. Assume ε follow a normal distribution
with mean zero and variance σ2(s), where σ(s) decreases in screening cost s and σ(0) = A. Then a principal spending
screening cost s would oﬀer incentive package that is optimal to a pool of agents with αi ∈ [cαi−σ(s), αi]. The analysis
is essentially the same as pooling and sorting discussed in the paper, and thus would lead to similar qualitative results
as using the simple screening method.
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while others shirk, where
αr ≡ ez+1 − wzrmr
by non-shirking condition (1). So the probability that a pooling agent makes eﬀort (hence producing
hp on average) is
F (bα)− F (αr)
F (bα) = 1− αrbα
under uniform distribution. The probability of shirking (and producing hq on average) is αrbα . So
the principal’s expected profit is
Qr = (1−
αrbα )(hp− wr) + αrbα (hq − (1−mr)wr)−mrkz+1.
Lemma 3 There exists a unique solution (w∗r ,m∗r) in maximizing profit Qr for non-screening prin-
cipals, where ∂m
∗
r
∂bα < 0, ∂w∗r∂bα < 0, ∂Q∗r∂bα > 0, Q∗r > Q∗.
This lemma (proof in the appendix) shows that both optimal wage w∗r and monitoring level
m∗r decrease in bα — the highest cooperative tendency among pooling agents. So the optimal profit
Q∗r increases in bα and is higher than Q∗ when screening is without cost. It is interesting to see
that costly screening actually benefits principals by enabling them to share the rent generated by
cooperative tendencies of pooling agents.
4.1.2 Screening
Since screening incurs a fixed lump-sum cost, the optimization problem of screening principals is
exactly the same as in the zero cost case. So they would choose the same optimal incentive package
(w∗i ,m
∗
i ) as before for an agent with αi ∈ [bα,A], though the maximal profit a principal can get is
now Q∗i − s. But in an equilibrium where some principals screen agents while others not, all must
earn the same profit Q∗r . And the diﬀerence between Q
∗
i − s and Q∗r is the sign-in bonus Bs(αi) for
an agent with αi ∈ [bα,A]:
Bs(αi) ≡ Q∗i − s−Q∗r . (14)
Note that it is the screened agents that ultimately pay the screening cost s. Bs(αi) can be rewritten
as
Bs(αi) = B(αi)− (Q∗r −Q∗)− s (15)
where B(αi) = Q∗ci − Q∗ as defined by (7) is the bonus under zero screening cost. Note that
Bs(αi) < B(αi) holds not only because agents have to pay the screening cost s, but also that the
alternative profit Q∗r is higher.
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The total income of an agent with αi ≥ bα is Is(αi) = Bs(αi) + w∗i , and
bBs(αi) ≡ Bs(αi) + w∗i − w∗r
is the extra income than the wage w∗r got by a pooling agent.
16 To make the marginal agent bα
indiﬀerent between pooling with others and being screened,
bBs(bα) = 0
must hold. bα is uniquely determined by this condition, which increases in s and decreases in k (the
proof is in the appendix). The following proposition summarizes the results we’ve got so far.
Proposition 5 When the screening cost s is positive, there exists a unique cooperative tendency bα
where agents with αi ∈ [0, bα] pool together and those with αi ∈ [bα,A] are screened. The threshold bα
increases in screening cost s and decreases in monitoring cost k. It is the screened agents who pay
the screening cost s. All principals, however, get a higher profit Q∗r > Q
∗.
4.2 Across-Generation Dynamics with Screening
Since pooling agents get the same wage regardless of individual cooperative tendencies, there is no
gain of acquiring any positive cooperative tendency lower than the threshold level worthwhile to
be screened. This implies that after the first generation any agents not screened must have zero
cooperative tendency. Knowing this, the non-screening principals would oﬀer the incentive package
(w∗,m∗) and get profit Q∗. So pooling unravels after one generation. Since in equilibrium screening
principals must also get profit Q∗, the rent Q∗r − Q∗ once captured by principals has to be passed
on to screened agents. So from the second generation onwards principals cannot get any rent from
agent cooperative tendencies.
Proposition 6 When cooperative tendencies are endogenously formed to maximize one’s welfare,
pooling unravels and principals cannot capture any rent for more than one generation. All principals
get the same profit Q∗ as when there is no screening cost.
Since for generations n ≥ 2 all principals get profit Q∗ and bottom agents earn income w∗, the
gross return of cooperative tendency investment is the same as before. The net return Rsi is lower
16The bBs(αi) diﬀers from its counterpart bB(αi) ≡ B(αi) + w∗ci − w∗ under zero screening cost by three channels:
the principals now earn a higher profit Q∗r ≥ Q∗, the alternative wage is lower since w∗r ≤ w∗, and finally a positive
screening cost s has to be paid. Since the highest bonus an agent can earn is z−1ωke, the necessary condition
s < z−1ωke must be satisfied to have a positive mass of screened agents.
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due to the positive screening cost:
Rsi = max
α2i
bB(α2i)− c(α2i;α1i)− s. (16)
The objective function for parents investing in α2i is max{Rsi, 0}, where 0 is achieved by not
investing. Since the screening cost s acts like a fixed cost, the optimal choice α∗2i is the same as in
(10) when Rsi ≥ 0.
Let bα2 be the threshold level of cooperative tendency such that Rsi(bα2) = 0. Let α1 denote
the lowest cooperative tendency among the first generation agents who invest in child cooperative
tendencies. Then it must be uniquely determined by bα2 = g(α1) since α2i = g(α1i) in (10) strictly
increases in α1i. The net return of investing in α2i > 0 is negative for families with α1i < α1, so
their descendents have zero cooperative tendency starting from the 2nd generation.17
For families with α1i ≥ α1 the evolution path is the truncated g(α) with α1i ∈ [α1, A], where
the steady state level cooperative tendency is again αc if bα2 ≤ αc, or bα2 if bα2 > αc. The mass of
cooperative agents from the second generation onwards is thus equal to
π(s, k) ≡ 1− F (α1).
From proposition (5) we know α1 must also increase in screening cost s and decrease in monitoring
cost k. It follows immediately that ∂π(s, k)/∂s < 0 and ∂π(s, k)/∂k > 0. That is, more agents
would acquire positive cooperative tendencies when screening cost is lower or monitoring is more
costly. Thus we have proved the following proposition.
Proposition 7 When the screening cost is positive, the across generation evolution of cooperative
tendency is composed of two parts: For families with α1i ≥ α1 it is the same as with zero screening
cost; agents from families with α1i < α1 have zero cooperative tendency starting from the second
generation. So in the steady state there are two groups of agents, π(s, k) of them are cooperative
with αc while the others completely selfish. Both the level of cooperative tendency αc and the mass
of cooperative agents π(s, k) increase in monitoring cost k, while π(s, k) also decreases in screening
cost s.
This proposition implies that in the long run social trust in society is higher if screening cost s is
lower and/or monitoring cost k is higher. The result is consistent with the empirical evidence that
17When families maximize over many generations things may be diﬀerent. For example, they may incur some loss
in the first few generations to invest in positive cooperative tendencies. This possibility is eliminated if families cannot
borrow against future.
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trust is higher in more homogenous communities (Alesina and La Ferrara 2002) since screening costs
are lower among people with similar backgrounds. Since the screening cost is paid by agents and
all principals still earn the same profit Q∗ as before, principals have no incentives to reduce either
screening or cooperative tendency investment costs. So the incentive structure on cost reduction is
the same as in the basic model.18
The technical characteristics of screening cost are aﬀected by many things. For example, infor-
mation technologies make it easier to record one’s past behaviors and thus tend to reduce s, but
higher mobility and globalization work in the opposite direction. Overall screening costs are more
individual-specific and thus less robust to agent identity changes than monitoring costs. So for both
incentive and technical reasons the monitoring cost tends to decrease faster than the screening cost,
which again leads to the decline of social trust over time. The opposite trend can be true in places
or times when technology changes very slowly and communities are stable for many years so that
the screening eﬃciency increases faster.
5 The Evolving of Social Trust and Economic Governance
In the steady state, both social trust and economic governance are determined by fundamental forces
in society such as the costs of screening, monitoring, and investing in agents. All these costs tend
to decrease overtime as a result of knowledge accumulation, albeit at unequal reduction rates due
to diﬀerent incentive structure and technical features. With some reasonable assumptions about
cost reduction rates, the theory developed above can be used to make sharp predictions about the
long-term evolving process of social trust and economic governance over time and across societies.
For simplicity we normalize the changing rate of cooperative tendency inoculation costs to zero
and focus on the relative movement of monitoring and screening costs. We also ignore the technical
diﬀerences between the two types of costs in order to concentrate on the eﬀects of their diﬀerent
incentive structures. The reduced form analysis is adopted where we assume the cost reduction rates
are higher if the associated aggregate benefits are larger.
18When the screening cost is positive in the multiple project situation, agents in equilibrium pool within a project
but not across projects, and pay bonds to principals with higher monitoring costs. On the other hand, the screening
principals may share the screening cost with the agents since they capture partial rent from cooperative tendency. In
the steady state there are still multiple levels of cooperative tendencies. The detailed analysis is omitted since both
the arguments and results are similar as the case with zero sceening cost.
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5.1 Trajectories Over Time
5.1.1 Monitoring Cost Reduction Process
Since all principals get profit Q∗ = hp − (1 + z−1)ωke, the aggregate marginal benefit of reducing
monitoring cost k is
|∂Q
∗
∂k
| = (1 + z−1)ωe (17)
for principals. Suppose the monitoring cost is reduced at rate τkt in period t such that
kt+1 = kt(1− τkt). (18)
We assume τ t is positively related to the marginal benefit such that
τkt = ρk|
∂Q∗t
∂kt
| ≡ τk
for some ρk ≥ 0, which is constant over time by (17). Since the aggregate agent income increases in
k, |∂Q∗∂k | is larger than the aggregate marginal benefit for the whole society. This implies that the
reduction rate τk of monitoring cost is too high compared to the social optimal level.
Let πt ≡ π(st, kt) be the mass of cooperative agents in the steady state at period t; (w∗t ,m∗t ) and
(w∗ct,m
∗
ct) are the optimal incentive packages for selfish and cooperative agents respectively. Then
the average governance cost Mt in a society is
Mt ≡ πt(w∗ct +m∗ctkz+1t ) + (1− πt)(w∗t +m∗tkz+1t ).
The economic governance intensity in a society is measured by the ratioMt/(w∗t+m
∗
t k
z+1
t ). Plugging
in the specific functions in (3) and (4) we get
Mt
w∗t +m
∗
t k
z+1
t
= 1− πt [1− (1− αct
ez+1
)
1
z+1 ].
So the economic governance intensity in a society decreases in both πt and αct, while by definition
social trust increases in both.
When screening cost keeps constant, in the next period we would have a lower monitoring cost
kt+1 < kt. This leads to a smaller πt+1 < πt and a lower cooperative tendency αc,t+1 < αc,t since
both of them decrease in kt+1. And this downward process would continue where social trust keeps
decreasing while economic governance intensity keeps increasing as long as the monitoring cost can
be further reduced.
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5.1.2 Screening Cost Reduction Process
Recall that only screened agents benefit from a lower screening cost, and each of them has the same
marginal benefit equal to one by condition (14). So the aggregate marginal benefit from reducing
screening cost is πt at period t, where πt ≡ π(st, kt) is the mass of cooperative agents in the steady
state at period t. We assume the reduction rate of screening cost τst increases in πt such that
τst = ρsπt
for some ρs ≥ 0, and
st+1 = st(1− τst). (19)
When the monitoring cost is constant, the next period screening cost st+1 < st is lower. This
would encourage more agents to become cooperative, which leads to πt+1 > πt given πs(s, k) < 0.
And this would lead to further decreasing of screening cost since τ st+1 > τ st and further increasing of
the mass of cooperative agents. So social trust keeps increasing while economic governance intensity
keeps decreasing as long as the screening cost can be reduced.
5.1.3 The Joint Process
The actual relationship between social trust and economic governance is determined simultaneously
by these two counteracting forces. If the relationship between monitoring cost reduction rate τk and
screening cost reduction rate τst in period t leads to πt+1 < πt , then in the next period there would
be less incentives in reducing the screening cost so that τs,t+1 < τ st holds. But this means the same
relationship between τk and τ st is strengthened over time so that the decrease of monitoring cost
would again dominates that of screening cost. So the downward trend of social trust, once started,
would not stop or reverse the direction by itself. If the opposite is true in period t, that is, if the
screening cost reduction is strong enough to increase πt+1 > πt, then this dominant relationship is
also reinforced over time. Again, the upward movement of social trust would continue without stop.
So if there are some exogenous shocks significant enough to change the direction for one period,
the whole history would then embark on a totally diﬀerent course thereafter. Otherwise, it is very
diﬃcult for the society itself to change direction or adopt successful institutions.
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5.2 Trajectories Across Societies
Let’s consider two otherwise identical social groups where the only diﬀerence is that one group has
a slightly lower screening cost.19 Let sL0 and sH0 denote the initial screening costs of the two
groups where sL0 < sH0. The initial monitoring cost is k0 for both groups. And they have access to
the same set of technologies that can be used to reduce both monitoring and screening costs. The
following analysis can be used to account for diﬀerences of the two trader groups discussed by Greif
(1994).
In the steady state the level of cooperative tendency αc is independent of screening costs so that
αL0 = αH0 = αc0. The mass of cooperative agents π(s, k) decreases in s so we have πL0 > πH0,
where πL0 ≡ π(sL0, k0) and πH0 ≡ π(sH0, k0). This implies that there are higher initial social trust
in L group than in H group, caused by a small diﬀerence in screening cost only.
Given πL0 > πH0, the screening cost decreases faster in L group so that sL1 < sH1 is still
true. So the relative strength between social trust and economic governance is preserved or even
strengthened over time for these two groups, no matter what time trajectories they are on. For
example, if πL1 < πL0 and πH1 < πH0 hold, by the above arguments we know the screening costs
would be reduced at decreasing rates in both societies where the rate in H group is even lower.
A second possible scenario is when πL1 > πL0 and πH1 > πH0 hold. Then the screening cost
is reduced at increasing rates where the reduction is faster in L group. A third scenario is when
πL1 > πL0 > πH0 > πH1 holds. That is, the two groups are heading into opposite directions
where L group sees rising social trust and declining monitoring. And the gap of social trust and
economic governance between the two groups also increases. In this case, a small initial diﬀerence
may eventually lead to two extreme situations.
Proposition 8 Both downward and upward movement of social trust and economic governance,
once started, would continue monotonically. Their relative strength across societies is preserved or
reinforced over time, where social trust is always lower and economic governance level is always
higher in a society with a higher screening cost initially.
The two societies also react diﬀerently to exogenous shocks. Suppose the two groups have op-
portunities to expand business by hiring agents from a third group. The high across-group screening
19For example, people living in plain mainland areas are more likely to become similar to each other than those
spread across diﬀerent islands or highlands. If similar backgrounds help reduce screening cost, then mainland society
would have a lower screening cost.
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cost is less an obstacle for principals from the low trust group since they do not rely much on screen-
ing. So they are more open to outsiders and would expand inter-group trading faster than the high
trust group (Greif 1994).
6 Conclusions
This paper studies the dynamic relationship between social trust and economic governance in a
context of principal-agent problem. The optimal incentive packages are determined by the existing
cooperative tendencies of agents, while in the long run both are functions of fundamental forces in the
economy such as the costs of monitoring and screening agents and the investment cost in cooperative
tendencies. Principals have incentives in reducing the monitoring costs but not in reducing screening
and investing costs. The technical features of these three costs also favor the monitoring technology
which is easier to be standardized and more robust to changes. Our model thus is able to account
for the decline of social trust and increase of economic governance in the recent history, and also the
comparison between groups with diﬀerent initial social trust levels.
The model can be extended in various ways. For example, there may be instant feedback eﬀects
from economic governance modes to agent cooperative tendencies in addition to the fixed dispositions
discussed in the paper. Some recent works in this line include Kreps (1997), Rob and Zemsky (2002),
and Akerlof and Kranton (2003) among others. The screening process can be endogenized through
repeated interactions among players, which may be used to study the dynamic interplay between
informal enforcement and formal institutions. A third extension is to add cognitive ability besides
cooperative tendency, which may give rise to results on changes of human capital components over
time.
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Appendix
1. The proof for Lemma 1.
Lemma 1: When a < 1z+1 holds, the unique optimal solution is
α∗2i ≡ g(α1i) = ez+1 − [γ(1 + α1i)
−b
1−a(z+1) ]z+1,
where γ ≡ (z(z+1)caωk )
1
1−a(z+1) . It is concave in α1i and increasing in monitoring cost k.
Proof. The objective function is
Ri ≡max
α2i
bB(α2i)− c(α2i;α1i)
= z−1ωk(e− (ez+1 − α2i)
1
z+1 )− c[e
(z+1)a − (ez+1 − α2i)a]
(1 + α1i)b
. (20)
The first order condition is
ωk
z(z + 1)
(ez+1 − α2i)
1
z+1−a − ca
(1 + α1i)b
= 0. (21)
The second order condition
−( 1
z + 1
− a) ωk
z(z + 1)
(ez+1 − α2i)
1
z+1−a−1 < 0
is satisfied when
a <
1
z + 1
,
which is assumed true.
From condition (21) we get the unique optimal choice
α∗2i ≡ g(α1i) = ez+1 − [γ(1 + α1i)
−b
1−a(z+1) ]z+1, (22)
where
γ ≡ (z(z + 1)ca
ωk
)
1
1−a(z+1) .
Since ∂α
∗
2i
∂k =
∂α∗2i
∂γ
∂γ
∂k and
∂α∗2i
∂γ
=−[(1 + α1i)
−b
1−a(z+1) ]z+1(z + 1)γz < 0,
∂γ
∂k
= (
z(z + 1)ca
ω
)
1
1−a(z+1)
−1
1− a(z + 1)k
−1
1−a(z+1) < 0,
it follows that ∂α
∗
2i
∂k > 0. α
∗
2i increases in α1i and is concave in it because the following conditions
∂α∗2i
∂α1i
=
b(z + 1)γz+1
1− a(z + 1) (1 + α1i)
−b(z+1)
1−a(z+1)−1 > 0,
∂2α∗2i
∂α21i
=−b(z + 1)γ
z+1
1− a(z + 1) [
b(z + 1)
1− a(z + 1) + 1](1 + α1i)
−b(z+1)
1−a(z+1)−2 < 0.
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are satisfied.
2. The proof for Lemma 2.
Lemma 2: Principals of project kj+1 get profit Qm∗j+1 for j ≥ 1 and those of project k1 get profit
Q∗(k1). Qm∗j+1 decreases in monitoring costs kj+1 while increases in αkj . The marginal gain of
monitoring cost reduction, however, is not only lower than the one project case, but also decreases
in αkj . The marginal profit gain of αkj increases in kj+1.
Proof. The profit Qm∗j+1 is
Qm∗j+1 =Q
∗(kj+1) + rj+1
= hp− ωkj+1z−1(ez+1 − αkj )
1
z+1 − ωkjz−1[ωkj(1 + z)e− (ez+1 − αkj )
1
z+1 ]. (23)
It decreases in monitoring costs kj+1 as before since
∂Qm∗j+1
∂kj+1
= −ωz−1(ez+1 − αkj )
1
z+1 < 0.
The marginal gain of monitoring cost reduction |∂Q
m∗
j+1
∂kj+1
| is, however, lower than the one project case
where
|∂Q
∗
∂k
| = (1 + z−1)ωke.
It becomes even lower when agents are more cooperative:
∂|∂Q
m∗
j+1
∂kj+1
|/∂αkj = −
1
z + 1
ωz−1(ez+1 − αkj )
1
z+1−1 < 0.
Furthermore, the profit increases in αkj since
∂Qm∗j+1
∂αkj
=
1
z(z + 1)
ω(kj+1 − kj)(ez+1 − αkj )
1
z+1−1 > 0,
and the increasing rate is higher for a higher kj+1 since
∂2Qm∗j+1
∂αkj∂kj+1
=
1
z(z + 1)
ω(ez+1 − αkj )
1
z+1−1 > 0.
Note αkj is the lowest cooperative tendency of agents working for the same project.
3. The proof for Lemma 3.
Lemma 3: There exists a unique solution (w∗r ,m
∗
r) in maximizing Qr where
∂m∗r
∂bα < 0, ∂w∗r∂bα < 0,
∂Q∗r
∂bα > 0, Q∗r > Q∗.
Proof. The profit for non-screening principals can be rewritten as
Qr = hp− wr −mrkz+1 −
ez+1 − wzrmrbα (h(p− q)−mrwr).
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The first order conditions to maximize Qr are, respectively,
w∗r :Qw = (e
z+1 − wzrmr)mr + (h(p− q)−mrwr)zwz−1r mr − bα = 0, (24)
m∗r :Qm = (e
z+1 − wzrmr)wr + (h(p− q)−mrwr)wzr = bαkz+1. (25)
It is straightforward to check that zero monitoring and wage cannot be optimal, which means
αr < ez+1 always holds even when bα = A.
The second derivatives are
Qww ≡D = −2zwz−1r m2r − (h(p− q)−mrwr)z(1− z)wz−2r mr < 0,
Qmm =−2wz+1r < 0,
Qwm ≡B = ez+1 − wzrmr + (h(p− q)− wzrmr)zwz−1r − (z + 1)wzrmr,
where Qwm ≡ B > 0 is assumed to be true due to the complementarity between wage and monitoring
level. The second order condition is
QmmQww −Q2wm = −2wz+1r D −B2 > 0,
which is assumed to be true.
The comparative statics wrt bα can be solved from
B
∂m∗r
∂bα +D∂w∗r∂bα = 1,
−2wz+1r
∂m∗r
∂bα +B∂w∗r∂bα = kz+1.
After simple manipulation we have
∂m∗r
∂bα = (B2 + 2wz+1r D)−1(B −Dkz+1) < 0,
∂w∗r
∂bα = (B2 + 2wz+1r D)−1(2wz+1r +Bkz+1) < 0,
since B > 0, D < 0, and B2 + 2wz+1r D < 0 by the second order condition.
Not surprisingly, the principal’s profit increases with bα:
∂Q∗r
∂bα = f(bα)F (e2 − w∗rm∗r)F 2(bα) (h(p− q)− w∗rm∗r) > 0.
Since Q∗r(bα = 0) = Q∗ = hp− (1 + z−1)ωke, it is obvious that Q∗r > Q∗.
4. Proof for proposition 5.
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Proposition 5: When the screening cost s is positive, (1) there exists a unique cooperative ten-
dency bα where agents with αi ∈ [0, bα] pool together and those with αi ∈ [bα,A] choose to be screened.
The threshold bα increases in screening cost s and decreases in the monitoring cost k. (2) In com-
parison with the perfect information case, all principals get a higher profit Q∗r , while screened agents
receive a lower sign-in bonus Bs(αi) and the same incentive package (w∗i ,m
∗
i ).
Proof. The income diﬀerence between a screened agent with a pooling one is
bBs(αi) ≡ B(αi)− (w∗r − w∗i )− (Q∗r −Q∗)− s.
For the agent with the threshold cooperative tendency bα the extra income is
bBs(bα) = Q∗ci(bα) + w∗ci(bα)−Q∗r(bα)− w∗r(bα)− s = 0. (26)
Let’s check whether such defined bα is unique. The first derivative of bBs(bα) with respect to bα
∂ bBs(bα)
∂bα = ∂[Q∗ci(bα) + w∗ci(bα)]∂bα − ∂[Q∗r(bα) + w∗r(bα)]∂bα > 0
is positive since the first item measures the marginal total output gain of cooperative tendency in
an unconstrained maximization which is larger than that in a constrained one measured by the
second item. Intuitively the pooling principal, because of imperfect information, adopts a higher
than necessary wage and monitoring level for agent with bα, which is a waste of resources. For the
same reason, we get
∂ bBs(bα)
∂k
=
∂[Q∗ci(bα) + w∗ci(bα)]
∂k
− ∂[Q
∗
r(bα) + w∗r(bα)]
∂k
> 0.
From the equation (26) we can get the comparative statics of the threshold cooperative tendency
bα by implicit function theorem
∂bα
∂s
=− −1
∂( bBs(bα) + s)/∂bα > 0,
∂bα
∂k
=−∂
bBs(bα)
∂k
/
∂ bBs(bα)
∂bα < 0.
So the threshold cooperative tendency bα increases with the screening cost s and decreases with the
monitoring cost k, which is quite intuitive. It implies that the proportion of principals who screen
agents is lower when s is larger or when k is smaller.
5. Proof for proposition 9: the case for a ∈ [ 1z+1 , 1).
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Proposition 9 : Suppose a ≥ 1z+1 holds. (1) With no screening cost, the distribution of cooperative
tendency degenerates to a single point ez+1 from the second generation onwards. Accordingly the
incentive package is (0, 0), agents’ bonus reaches the highest level (1 + z−1)ωke. The principals
still earn the same profit Q∗ as in the static environment. (2) With positive screening cost, the
distribution of cooperative tendency degenerates into two points from the second generation onwards,
where those with α1i ≥α1 have α∗(n+1)i = ez+1 and others 0. The mass of cooperative agents,
1− F (α1), decreases in screening cost s and increase in monitoring cost k.
Proof. When 1z+1 ≤ a < 1, the cost function is still convex but the second order condition fails.
That is, the net benefit bB(α2i)− c(α2i;α1i) is now convex in α2i. So the optimal solution is either
α2i = ez+1 or 0 depending on whether the net return is positive or not. Since the cost decreases in
α1i, it is helpful to check whether the parent with α1i = 0 wants to invest or not. The net return of
such a parent
R0 ≡ z−1ωke− ce(z+1)a
= z−1ωke(1− zce
(z+1)a−1
ωk
)
= z−1ωke(1− 1
(z + 1)a
(
e
γ
)(z+1)a−1) > 0
is positive since γ < e and a < 1z+1 . This implies all parents invest in e
z+1 and from the second
generation onwards the distribution of cooperative tendency degenerates into a single point ez+1.
Since all agents are fully trustworthy, no incentive package is needed so that both monitoring and
eﬃciency wage are zero. All agents earn the highest possible bonus (1 + z−1)ωke and the social
welfare reaches the maximum hp, while principals are still earning the same profit Q∗ as before.
When cooperative tendencies are endogenous the case of 1z+1 ≤ a < 1 is also similar in that
agents whose net returns are larger or equal to the screening cost will invest in ez+1. Suppose agents
with α1i ≥α1 will invest, where α1 is defined by the equation
Rs = bB(ez+1)− c(ez+1;α1)− s = 0.
Plug in the functional forms we get
α1 = (
ce(z+1)a
z−1ωke− s )
1
b − 1.
It is easy to see that α1 increases in s and decreases in k, which is the same as α1.
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